Which Marc Lou products still make money?

How many Marc Lou products are actually making money now?

Marc Lou currently has around a dozen products bringing in at least some revenue, but only five make enough money to really affect his business.

Marc’s own live portfolio shows roughly $84,000 a month across his monetized products. TrustMRR and DataFast dominate the page at about $40,500 and $27,700 respectively. Ship or Die contributes another $7,200, followed by CodeFast at roughly $4,600 and ShipFast at around $2,500.

After those five, the numbers fall off a cliff. IndiePage makes a few hundred dollars a month. ByeDispute, Habits Garden, LaunchViral and SuperShrimp are each around the low hundreds. PoopUp is at $19. Several other products currently show zero.

Marc Lou still has a broad portfolio in the literal sense, but the income is concentrated. The five largest products account for roughly 99% of the revenue displayed on his personal site, while TrustMRR and DataFast alone contribute about 82%.

Product	Current monthly revenue	Approx. share of portfolio
TrustMRR	~$40.5K	~48%
DataFast	~$27.7K	~33%
Ship or Die	~$7.2K	~9%
CodeFast	~$4.6K	~6%
ShipFast	~$2.5K	~3%
All smaller paid products combined	~$1.2K	~1%

When we say a Marc Lou product “makes money,” do we mean revenue or profit?

For Marc Lou’s products, we can verify customer revenue quite well, while product-level profit remains much harder to prove.

That distinction is worth making before going further. TrustMRR connects directly to payment providers such as Stripe and RevenueCat using read-only access, so its current revenue, subscriptions and MRR figures are considerably stronger evidence than screenshots typed into a founder dashboard. Marc has connected his own portfolio to that system.

Expenses are less transparent. We do not have a complete cost breakdown for every product covering hosting, APIs, refunds, contractors, payment fees and Marc’s own time.

There is good evidence that the overall operation throws off a lot of cash. In two recent monthly revenue breakdowns, Marc reported margins of around 85%. With a portfolio producing roughly $80,000 to $100,000 in a normal month, that points to a highly profitable solo operation overall.

We therefore use “makes money” to mean that a product is currently generating real customer revenue. Calling every $100-a-month side project a meaningful profitable business would go too far.

Are ShipFast and CodeFast still carrying Marc Lou’s business?

ShipFast and CodeFast no longer carry Marc Lou’s business; their combined contribution has dropped from roughly half his monthly income to less than 10%.

The change happened quickly. At the start of the year, Marc still described ShipFast and CodeFast as his main income sources. In January, CodeFast generated about $23,500 and ShipFast $17,200. Together they brought in $40,700 from total income of $94,799.

These days, the pair makes roughly $7,000 combined.

Meanwhile, TrustMRR and DataFast moved in the opposite direction. Those businesses now generate well above $60,000 a month together. Marc’s income therefore remained in roughly the same order of magnitude even as the two products most associated with his public reputation shrank dramatically.

Calling Marc primarily “the ShipFast guy” is increasingly outdated. His audience may still know him for boilerplates and coding products, but most of his money now comes from startup data, analytics and marketplace activity.

Is TrustMRR now Marc Lou’s biggest business?

TrustMRR is currently Marc Lou’s biggest product, producing around $40,000 in a recent 30-day window and considerably more revenue than anything else he owns.

TrustMRR only launched in late 2025, yet its verified lifetime revenue has already crossed $300,000. More importantly, the business did not disappear after the initial launch rush.

Marc reported roughly $22,900 from TrustMRR in December, $31,400 in January and $33,300 in February. Revenue then stayed around the high-$20,000s to mid-$30,000s for several months before reaching $44,000 in his most recent complete monthly breakdown.

The product also changed along the way. TrustMRR began as a database where founders could prove startup revenue. Marc later added a marketplace for buying and selling those startups. TrustMRR now charges a 3% platform fee on completed acquisitions, split between the buyer and seller, alongside its subscription revenue.

The marketplace also gives TrustMRR access to much larger individual transactions than Marc’s old products could produce. A $500,000 acquisition, for example, represents $15,000 of platform fees before considering subscription income.

TrustMRR has now spent long enough at the top of Marc’s portfolio that calling it a launch spike no longer fits the evidence.

Is DataFast Marc Lou’s healthiest SaaS?

DataFast currently looks like Marc Lou’s strongest conventional SaaS, with roughly $29,000 in MRR and more than 1,300 active subscriptions.

The growth has been unusually steady for a Marc Lou product. DataFast generated about $15,900 in December, $17,500 in January and $19,700 in February. It then spent several months around $20,000 to $21,000 before jumping to $26,000 in Marc’s latest complete monthly breakdown. The live revenue counter has lately been even higher.

That trajectory looks very different from Marc’s launch-heavy products. DataFast took around four months just to reach its first $1,000 MRR. By the end of 2025, Marc said it was approaching 1,000 paying customers with churn of roughly 7%. The verified account now shows 1,336 active subscriptions.

TrustMRR makes more money overall, partly because acquisition fees can create large one-off payments. DataFast has the cleaner recurring base. If we had to pick the Marc Lou product that currently looks most like a durable SaaS rather than an audience-driven launch machine, DataFast would be it.

Is Ship or Die still selling after the launch rush?

Ship or Die is still a meaningful Marc Lou product, although revenue has clearly cooled since its first big month.

The product launched with a simple offer: pay $299 and join a group where members have to ship an app every 30 days. It produced about $20,000 in its first reported full month, followed by $15,000 and then $13,000. The current 30-day figure sits around $7,000.

That is a drop of roughly two-thirds from the early peak.

There is one important bit of context: Ship or Die is sold as a one-time purchase rather than a subscription. Every month starts with no guaranteed recurring revenue, so continuously replacing the entire customer base is inherently harder than retaining SaaS subscribers.

Even after the slowdown, Ship or Die has already passed $110,000 in verified lifetime revenue. A product still generating several thousand dollars per month after the initial audience burst has gone further than most of Marc’s experiments.

For now, we would describe Ship or Die as a successful launch that is settling toward a lower level. Whether $7,000 becomes $5,000, $2,000 or stabilizes around here will tell us much more about its durability.

Is CodeFast still making money now that AI can teach people to code?

CodeFast still makes roughly $5,000 a month today, but the coding course has lost most of the revenue it generated at the beginning of the year.

CodeFast made about $23,500 in January and another $14,900 in February. By April, monthly sales had fallen to $3,400. It later recovered to $8,000 in May and $9,000 in June before slipping again to $6,000 in the following month. The latest verified 30-day revenue is around $4,600 to $5,000.

Marc himself has linked the decline to AI coding tools. That explanation is plausible given what CodeFast sells: a shortcut for beginners who want to learn enough coding to build online products. Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and other coding agents increasingly provide another shortcut toward the same goal.

Still, customers have not stopped buying CodeFast. The course has passed $820,000 in verified lifetime revenue and continues to generate several thousand dollars a month with no subscription base.

AI has hurt CodeFast badly without wiping it out. At around one-fifth of its January sales level, CodeFast now behaves more like a valuable back-catalogue product than one of Marc’s main growth engines.

Is ShipFast still a real business today?

ShipFast is still a real revenue-generating product today, but its current sales are tiny compared with the business that once made Marc Lou famous.

ShipFast has generated roughly $1.3 million in verified lifetime revenue. These days, however, its 30-day revenue moves around only $2,000 to $3,000.

The decline was already obvious before the current figure. ShipFast generated around $20,300 in December and $17,200 in January. Sales fell below $10,000 in February, reached about $6,200 in April, briefly recovered to $7,000 in May and then dropped into the low thousands.

That leaves current sales more than 80% below the level seen around the turn of the year. Compared with periods when Marc said ShipFast was doing tens of thousands of dollars per month, the fall is even larger.

Yet $2,500 a month from a three-year-old codebase sold through one-time purchases still has economic value, especially when the incremental cost of another customer is low. ShipFast deserves to be called a declining product rather than a dead one.

Which smaller Marc Lou products still get paid customers?

Several smaller Marc Lou products still receive payments today, but IndiePage is the only one consistently generating more than a few hundred dollars a month.

IndiePage currently sits around $600 to $700 per month and has generated more than $50,000 in verified lifetime revenue. Recent monthly results have moved up and down, but the product repeatedly returns to the same few-hundred-dollar range. That persistence makes IndiePage more interesting than its small size suggests.

Below it, the numbers become very small. ByeDispute is around $117. Habits Garden is roughly $120 to $140, including a tiny recurring subscription base. LaunchViral is around $129. SuperShrimp is in the same range. PoopUp produces about $19.

Stalkr is a particularly fresh case. TrustMRR recently began showing a small amount of revenue and MRR for the product while Marc’s personal portfolio still showed zero, suggesting the pages were simply updating at different times. At this scale, the exact figure is less important than the fact that monetization has only just begun.

Product	Current revenue	What the number suggests
IndiePage	~$600–$700/month	Small but persistent
SuperShrimp	~$100–$150/month	Launch revenue mostly gone
Habits Garden	~$120–$140/month	Tiny recurring business
LaunchViral	~$130/month	Long-tail sales
ByeDispute	~$117/month	Long-tail sales
Stalkr	Tens of dollars	Just starting to monetize
PoopUp	~$19/month	Technically still selling

Which Marc Lou products have basically stopped making money?

ZenVoice, WorkbookPDF, BioAge and VirallyBot currently generate no meaningful revenue, while several old portfolio entries are also sitting at zero.

VirallyBot is straightforward: Marc explicitly labels the product discontinued. It once reached about $4,000 MRR and around $80,000 in total revenue, but it belongs to an earlier chapter of his career.

BioAge had a brief $49 revenue appearance shortly after launch and then disappeared back to zero. WorkbookPDF had occasional transactions worth a few dozen dollars but currently shows nothing.

ZenVoice faded more gradually. It was still making hundreds of dollars in some earlier months before falling into double digits and eventually reaching zero on the latest verified window.

There are also products such as MakeLanding and GameWidget that should be treated differently. Marc sold those businesses, reportedly for $35,000 and $4,000 respectively, so their absence from his current monthly revenue says nothing about whether the launches succeeded.

The zero-revenue group also shows how Marc actually operates. He launches a lot, lets weak products fade and keeps moving. His public portfolio contains many more creations than functioning businesses.

Do Marc Lou’s new launches usually keep making money?

Most Marc Lou launches do not become durable businesses, and SuperShrimp gives us one of the clearest recent examples.

SuperShrimp launched as a $17 Mac app that uses the computer camera to warn users when their posture deteriorates. It generated about $5,600 during its breakout month. One month later, revenue was around $1,000. It then collapsed to roughly $170 and has lately been hovering close to $100.

That is a fall of roughly 98% from the initial spike.

BioAge barely monetized at all before disappearing back to zero. Other small experiments on Marc’s portfolio remain free or never show meaningful commercial activity. Ship or Die has held up much better, although its sales have also come down substantially from launch.

That gives us a useful base rate for every new Marc Lou product. A strong launch tells us that Marc can distribute something to his audience. Sustained revenue several months later is the much harder test.

DataFast and TrustMRR passed that test. Most of the portfolio did not.

How much of Marc Lou’s revenue is recurring now?

Marc Lou currently has about $50,000 of verified MRR, and almost all of it comes from DataFast and TrustMRR.

DataFast contributes roughly $29,000 in MRR from more than 1,300 active subscriptions. TrustMRR adds around $20,500. Habits Garden and Stalkr contribute only tiny amounts beyond those two.

This is a major change in the economics of Marc’s portfolio. ShipFast, CodeFast and Ship or Die all rely on one-time purchases. They need new buyers every month to reproduce the previous month’s revenue. DataFast starts each month with an installed base of paying subscribers, while TrustMRR combines subscription revenue with marketplace transactions.

Comparing MRR with Marc’s roughly $84,000 live monthly portfolio total is imperfect because the two figures measure different things. Still, recurring revenue equivalent to roughly 60% of that monthly level shows how far the business has moved away from depending entirely on launches and one-off sales.

Product	Approx. MRR	Revenue model
DataFast	~$29K	Subscription SaaS
TrustMRR	~$20.5K	Subscriptions + marketplace fees
Habits Garden	~$18	Mostly small app purchases
Stalkr	~$29	Early subscription revenue
ShipFast	$0	One-time purchases
CodeFast	$0	One-time purchases
Ship or Die	$0	One-time purchases

Can we actually trust Marc Lou’s public revenue numbers?

Marc Lou’s current revenue figures are unusually credible for a build-in-public founder, although we still would not treat them like audited accounts.

The strongest reason is technical. TrustMRR says verified startups connect through read-only APIs from payment providers including Stripe and RevenueCat. Revenue figures are pulled from those systems rather than manually typed into a profile, and the platform updates the data frequently.

Marc’s own products use that verification system.

His public monthly posts also give us another check. The totals he publishes generally line up with the underlying product figures visible through TrustMRR, allowing for rounding and the fact that a rolling 30-day counter will never perfectly match a calendar month.

There are still limitations. Marc owns TrustMRR, so the verification layer is not independent of the founder we are studying. Individual pages sometimes refresh at slightly different times. Revenue also tells us nothing definitive about refunds outside the displayed treatment, taxes, shared costs or how Marc values his own labor.

For the question here, though, the evidence is strong enough. We can be quite confident that customers are currently paying these amounts. We should be more cautious when turning those revenue numbers into precise claims about product-level profit.

Is Marc Lou’s portfolio stronger now than when ShipFast was booming?

Marc Lou’s portfolio looks financially stronger today because newer recurring businesses have replaced most of the revenue lost by ShipFast and CodeFast without dragging his overall income down with them.

At the end of 2025, Marc reported $1.032 million of annual income, down 20% from the previous year. ShipFast and CodeFast were still his primary income sources, each around $20,000 a month. DataFast had reached $15,800 MRR, while TrustMRR was only beginning to establish itself.

Since then, the old engines have shrunk dramatically while DataFast roughly doubled its recurring base and TrustMRR became Marc’s largest product.

The current portfolio also has a different mix of customer behavior. ShipFast and CodeFast depend on people deciding to buy a new codebase or course. DataFast has more than 1,300 active subscriptions. TrustMRR has recurring subscribers plus acquisition fees tied to real startup transactions.

Concentration remains the obvious weakness. Two products now generate more than four-fifths of Marc’s visible product revenue. A serious problem at either DataFast or TrustMRR would be felt immediately.

Even with that concentration, the business has become harder to dismiss as an endless loop of selling startup products to aspiring startup founders. A growing analytics SaaS and an active acquisition marketplace now provide most of the revenue.

So which Marc Lou products still make money?

Five Marc Lou products genuinely matter financially today: TrustMRR, DataFast, Ship or Die, CodeFast and ShipFast.

TrustMRR and DataFast are in a different league from everything else. Together, they produce roughly four-fifths of Marc’s visible monthly product revenue and almost all of his meaningful recurring revenue.

Ship or Die is the strongest newer one-time product, although sales have been falling from its launch peak. CodeFast continues to bring in several thousand dollars a month despite being far below its earlier level. ShipFast has declined even further, yet customers are still buying enough copies for it to remain a small business.

IndiePage survives as a persistent few-hundred-dollar product. SuperShrimp, Habits Garden, LaunchViral, ByeDispute, PoopUp and Stalkr currently produce small amounts. ZenVoice, BioAge, WorkbookPDF, VirallyBot and several legacy entries are effectively at zero.

The interesting answer has little to do with how many startups Marc has launched. His current business rests on two big products, three useful smaller ones and a long tail that contributes almost nothing.

The portfolio also looks very different from the one people still associate with Marc Lou. ShipFast made him famous. CodeFast extended the formula. Today, most of the money comes from TrustMRR and DataFast. That replacement is the main reason Marc Lou is still making roughly the same order of magnitude of income even after his old hits faded.